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Abstract
Background: People have fought for their civil rights, primarily the right to live in dignity. At present, the development of
technology in medicine and healthcare led to an apparent paradox: many people are fighting for the right to die. This study
was aimed at testing whether different moral principles are associated with different attitudes towards end-of-life decisions
for patients with a severe brain damage.
Methodology: We focused on the ethical decisions about withdrawing life-sustaining treatments in patients with severe
brain damage. 202 undergraduate students at the University of Padova were given one description drawn from four profiles
describing different pathological states: the permanent vegetative state, the minimally conscious state, the locked-in
syndrome, and the terminal illness. Participants were asked to evaluate how dead or how alive the patient was, and how
appropriate it was to satisfy the patient’s desire.
Principal Findings: We found that the moral principles in which people believe affect not only people’s judgments
concerning the appropriateness of the withdrawal of life support, but also the perception of the death status of patients
with severe brain injury. In particular, we found that the supporters of the Free Choice (FC) principle perceived the death
status of the patients with different pathologies differently: the more people believe in the FC, the more they perceived
patients as dead in pathologies where conscious awareness is severely impaired. By contrast, participants who agree with
the Sanctity of Life (SL) principle did not show differences across pathologies.
Conclusions: These results may shed light on the complex aspects of moral consensus for supporting or rejecting end-of-life
decisions.
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Introduction
Over the past decades, the ethical decisions surrounding
end-of-life issues [1,2] posed more questions than they
answered. Although there is a substantial consensus among
ethicists and medical-legal experts regarding not considering
the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatments as criminal acts
when these actions are consistent with patient or proxy
decisions [3], cases such as Terri Schiavo in the U.S. or
Eluana Englaro in Italy brought the right to die issue to the
attention of the public. This gave rise to heated debates [4–6]
between those who opposed to the removal of life support,
saying it was comparable to euthanasia, and those who favored
it if this was the patient’s will (for a definition of euthanasia and
related issues, see [7]). A fundamental aspect of the right-to-die
debate is tightly related to the question of what it means to be
alive [8]. The answer to this question is neither simple nor
unambiguous.
In the present study, we investigated how healthy persons
perceive patients with severe brain damage: are these patients
considered fully alive? Under what circumstances, if ever, do
people agree in withdrawing life support from these patients?
Jennett [9,10] reported that nearly 90% of people considered
permanent vegetative state worse than death. More recently,
Demertzi et al. [11] updated the end-of-life attitudes towards
vegetative state and determined the end-of-life attitudes towards
minimal conscious state in a sample of medical and paramedical
professionals. In this study, we aimed at measuring just ‘‘how
alive’’ patients with severe brain injury are perceived.
Two positions characterize the discussion of withdrawal of life
support: One position could be described as the Sanctity of Life
(SL) principle, according to which every act or omission causing
death (even if it eliminates suffering) would constitute a murder
and is contrary to the dignity of a human being, and must be
considered morally unacceptable. Human life is sacred because
from its beginning it involves the creative action of God. ‘‘God
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under any circumstances claim for himself the right to destroy an
innocent human being’’ [12]. On the other hand, people who tend
toward a more liberal position ascribe to each person the right to
withhold or withdraw life support, if life supports prolong the
process of dying and suffering. In other words, people have the
right to decide on their own lives. This position may be referred to
as Free Choice (FC) principle.
Our main hypothesis is that people who endorse different moral
principles have also a different representation of how alive a patient
affected by severe brain damage is. SL and FC principles might
subtend different concepts of being alive, in which the attribution
of consciousness plays a fundamental role. Investigating how
people perceive patients in which conscious awareness is lost (or
severely impaired) provides key information for the understanding
of the conflicting positions on the right-to-die issue.
Consciousness has two main components: wakefulness and
awareness [13,14]. These two components are present in various
degrees in patients with severe brain damage. For instance, in
both the permanent vegetative state (PVS) and minimally
conscious state (MCS), the patient is awake, but they differ in
awareness: the former is entirely unaware of self and environ-
ment, whereas the latter show limited evidence of awareness of
self and environment [15,16]. The Multi Society Task Force on
Vegetative State [17] concluded that 3 months after non-
traumatic brain damage and 12 months after a traumatic in-
jury, the condition of vegetative patients may be considered
permanent. Given proper medical care (i.e. artificial hydration
and nutrition), patients can survive for many years. Minimally
conscious patients show minimal but definite behavioral
evidence of self or environmental awareness, and emergence
from this state is characterized by the ability to communicate or
use objects functionally [16]. The prognosis of MCS patients is
significantly more favorable than those in PVS, however, some
patients may remain in a MCS permanently. In contrast,
patients with locked-in syndrome are characterized by awareness
of the environment, aphonia or hypophonia, and quadriplegia or
quadriparesis. Eye or eyelid movements are the main method of
communication [18,19], but is lost in the completely locked-in
state [20]. The error rate in diagnosing and separating PVS from
MCS and locked-in syndrome is high, ranging from 20 to 40%
errors [21–24].
In the present study, we aimed at testing whether different
moral principles are associated with different attitudes towards the
life status of patients with a severe brain damage and towards the
agreement to withdraw life-sustaining treatment in patients who
ask for it.
Methods
Participants
A total of 202 undergraduate students (162 females, age range:
18–29 years) at the University of Padova participated in the
study. Participants were tested in a classroom setting and were
informed that their responses would remain anonymous. Oral
consent to participate was obtained after written information
about the study. The study was conducted according to the
Declaration of Helsinki and reviewed and approved by the Ethics
Committee of the Department of General Psychology of the
University of Padova. Written informed consent was waived by
the local Ethics Committee because of the anonymous nature of
the collected data. Furthermore, participants had the right to
refuse to answer any question and to withdraw from the study at
any time.
Study Design and Hypotheses
All participants were first given a booklet containing the
instructions and one description drawn from four profiles
describing different pathological states including the permanent
vegetative state and the minimally conscious state (PVS and MCS,
characterized by different degree of awareness), the locked-in
syndrome (LI, in which patients are conscious but paralyzed and
voiceless), and a description of a patient with terminal illness (TI,
in which the patient is conscious and may refuse medical
treatments).
Terminal illness was included in the experimental design as
control condition to be compared with PVS, MCS, and LI, given
that the second paragraph of article n. 32 of the Italian
Constitution recognizes a person’s right to refuse treatment, even
in cases where withholding therapies may lead to death.
Participants were instructed to carefully read the administered
material and to answer the questions regarding the scenario by
giving their own opinion. They were told that there were no right
or wrong answers, and were asked to respond honestly and only
after thorough deliberation.
After they had read the instructions, to limit subjective
interpretations of the terms ‘‘alive’’ or ‘‘dead’’, and in order to
set a more ‘‘objective’’ starting point, we provided participants
with a clinical definition of brain death [25] before introducing the
text that described the patient’s condition: ‘‘In legal medicine a person
in considered dead when brain death is diagnosed. Brain death is the irreversible
end of all brain activity.’’
Participants were then given the scenario according to the
condition they were randomly assigned (PVS, MCS, LI, or TI). A
full description of the four scenarios can be found in Table S1.
After reading the scenario, participants were asked to evaluate
how dead or how alive (according to the conditions they were
randomly assigned) the patient was, using a 11-point scale ranging
from 0 to 100. Participants who read the PVS, the MCS, or the LI
scenarios were asked to imagine that the patient, prior the brain
traumatic incident and in full capacity of willing and understand-
ing, had expressed a desire not to remain in such a condition.
Participants who read the LI scenario were also told that this
decision was not revoked after the onset of the pathological
condition. Participants who read the TI scenario were told that the
patient had asked for the interruption of medical treatments, with
the exception of pain medications.
Participants were then asked to use the same 11-point scale to
evaluate how appropriate it was to satisfy the patient’s desire.
Finally, participants were asked to express their agreement (using a
11-point scale ranging from 0 to 10) with two moral principles
describing two different positions concerning the end-of-life issue.
The FC principle emphasized the role of human free choice,
ascribing to human beings the right to decide for themselves what
happens with their lives: ‘‘Every human being has the right to choose freely
regarding his own life and well-being. No one can interfere with the right to
choose freely and in full capacity of willing and understanding, even when the
person’s will is to decline medical treatment that is aimed at keeping him alive’’.
The SL principle emphasizes that human beings are more than
simple living beings, with transcendent qualities that characterize
their existence as a person: ‘‘Human life is sacred and inviolable. No one,
under any circumstance, can claim the right to end the life of any human being,
including himself’’.
Participants completed the questionnaire by providing infor-
mation about age, gender, level of education, religion, and political
attitude. At the end of the study, they were thanked and fully
debriefed.
We expected the SL and FC principles to capture different
people’s judgments concerning the appropriateness in satisfying
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to refuse) any form of medical treatment. In particular, we
hypothesized that the more people endorse the FC principle, the
more they would judge the behavior as appropriate. At the same
time, the more people endorse the SL principle, the more they
would judge the behavior as inappropriate. While these predic-
tions are quite intuitive because it is generally assumed that moral
principles guide people’s action and judgments, it is difficult to
predict whether people endorsing different principles actually have
different perceptions of the life status of patients who are affected
by different pathologies. In other words, do people endorsing the
FC principle perceive patients in which consciousness is impaired
the same way as do people who endorse the SL principle?
Results
Death Status Perception
To test whether and how the two moral principles affected the
perception of the death status of patients, we ran a multiple
regression analysis in which pathology (PVS, MCS, LI, and TI)
and moral principles (FC=Statement 1; SL=Statement 2) were
entered as predictors. The overall equation was significant:
R
2=.36; F(5, 196)=21.68; p,.001. As can be seen in Table 1
(Model 1), pathology and FC principle were significant predictors
of death status. In other words, people perceived the four
pathologies differently, as shown by the B-values indicating that
PVS received the highest ratings of death status (planned
comparisons using TI as a reference class are also reported in
Table 1). Furthermore, the more participants agreed with the FC
principle, the more they rated the patient described in the scenario
as being dead. By including the interaction between pathology and
moral principles increased the predictive power of the model,
R
2=.41; F(11, 190)=12.05, p,.001 (Model 2 in Table 1).
It is worth noting that in this second regression analysis,
pathology was still significant and interacted significantly with the
FC principle but not with the SL principle. The significant
interaction between pathology and the FC principle indicates that
participants endorsing the FC principle perceived the death status
of the patients with different pathologies differently: the positive
correlation between FC principle and death status hold for MCS
and PVS, but not for LI and TI. In particular, when used as a
reference for planned comparison, TI was marginally different
from LI, but was significantly different from both MCS and PVS
(see Table 1). This finding is represented in Figure 1, where the
linear regression curves for each of the four pathologies are
shown. As it can be seen, the slope of the linear regression curve
is steep for MCS and SVP, whereas the curve is much flatter for
TI and LI. The lack of interaction between pathology and the SL
principle is of particular interest because it suggests that death
status ratings provided by participants who endorsed this
principle were substantially equal across the four types of
pathologies.
Appropriateness of treatment withdrawal
To test whether and how the two moral principles affected the
judgments of appropriateness in satisfying the patient’s request to
refuse any form of medical treatment, we ran a multiple regression
analysis in which FC principle, SL principle, and pathology (PVS,
MCS, LI, and TI) were entered as predictors. The overall
equation was significant [R
2=.65, F(5, 196)=72.86, p,.0001].
Both the FC and SL principles were significant predictors (F (1,
196)=219.16, p,.00001 and F (1, 196)=6.94, p,.01, respec-
tively), showing that participants who highly agreed with the FC
principle judged withdrawing of treatment as being highly
appropriate, whereas participants who highly agreed with the SL
principle expressed lower agreement with this decision. Also
pathology reached significance (F (3, 196)=4.50, p,.01) showing
that people judged the four pathologies differently. Planned
comparisons using TI as a reference class showed no significant
difference for MCS (B=1.13, SE=2.91, t=0.39, p=.70) and
marginally significant differences for LI (B=25.29, SE=2.93,
t=21.81, p=.07) and PVS (B=5.43, SE=2.92, t=1.86, p=.06,
with judgments of appropriateness being lower an higher,
respectively, as compared to TI. The interactions between
pathology and the FC principle and between pathology and the
SL principle did not reach significance when included in the
model (p=.60 and p=.09, respectively).
Discussion
In the present study, we have demonstrated that there is a
predictable correlation between the moral principles in which
people trust and the agreement to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment in patients who ask for it. Specifically, the more people
agree with the Free Choice (FC) principle the more they judge
treatment withdrawal as appropriate, and the more people agree
with the Sanctity of Life (SL) principle the more they judge
treatment withdrawal as inappropriate. Furthermore, the lack of
significant interactions between pathology and moral principles
indicate that appropriateness of treatment withdrawal do not rely
on the clinical characteristics defining the different pathological
states, but rather on personal beliefs and moral convictions.
What is striking is that the more people believe in the FC
principle, the more they perceive patients as dead in instances
where conscious awareness is severely impaired or lost (namely,
minimally conscious state and permanent vegetative state patients).
Table 1. Multiple regression analyses on death status
perception as dependent variable.
Fd f p B S E t p
MODEL 1
(R
2=.36)
21.68 5,196 ,.0001
Pathology 32.63 3,196 ,.0001
TI vs. LI 32.67 4.90 6.67 ,.0001
TI vs. MCS 26.07 4.93 5.29 ,.0001
TI vs. PVS 47.51 4.92 9.65 ,.0001
FC 5.58 1,196 .019
SL .83 1,196 .364
MODEL 2
(R
2=.41)
12.05 11,190 ,.0001
Pathology 34.17 3,190 ,.0001
TI vs. LI 32.25 4.78 6.75 ,.0001
TI vs. MCS 26.17 4.81 5.44 ,.0001
TI vs. PVS 47.35 4.78 9.90 ,.0001
FC 2.61 1,190 .108
SL .54 1,190 .465
Pathology x FC 2.97 3,190 .033
(TI vs. LI) x FC 6.12 3.20 1.91 .057
(TI vs. MCS) x FC 7.28 2.79 2.61 .001
(TI vs. PVS) x FC 7.24 2.76 2.62 .001
Pathology x SL 1.13 3,190 .337
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031735.t001
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psychological and philosophical aspects must be considered in
order to better understand end-of-life issues. Indeed, for the
supporters of the FC principle, as opposed to those who agree with
the SL principle, conscious awareness seems to be central in
defining what it does mean to be alive.
The attitude that life is sacred does not necessarily involve
religious connotations. Rather, it involves the belief that human
life is inviolable and that we have the duty to respect one of the
most relevant aspect of the biological life, that is, self-preservation.
In this respect, life has an ‘‘intrinsic’’ value that transcends every
other characterization in terms of quality of life or social
interactions. Our results have shown that this intrinsic value is of
great importance for the supporters of the SL principle, as they
judged a patient in a permanent vegetative state as much alive as
other patients affected by different pathologies. On the contrary,
for a supporter of the FC principle to be alive is more
controversial. Indeed, this concept has been one of the most
heavily contested subjects in the philosophical thought. James
Rachels [26], for example, claims that we could refer to the term
life in two different ways. We may refer to living things, that is,
things that are alive. To be alive means to be a functioning
biological organism and, in relation to this, people as well as
animals and trees are living things. Conversely, when we speak of
life, we may have a different concept of life in mind, a concept that
belongs more to biography than to biology. In this respect, a
human being is not simply alive; rather, he/she has a life, and the
permanent loss of conscious awareness could be perceived as
similar to the death of the person. Thus, patients in permanent
vegetative state might no longer be considered to have a life,
despite the fact that they are alive in terms of their basic vital
functions.
The role of conscious awareness could be the key concept to
understanding the debate surrounding withdrawal decisions.
Indeed, a positive correlation between the adherence to the FC
principle and death status perception for patients in which
conscious awareness is lost (or severely impaired) suggest in this
case a sort of ‘‘consciousness-life equation’’. We might speculate
that being aware of both self and the environment (i.e., the content
of consciousness [14]) is, for some people, what gives individuals a
life. This does not hold for the supporters of the SL principle, for
whom there are no differences among the four pathologies. Given
this state of affairs, then, we could be induced to think that
conflicting viewpoints regarding the ethics of withdrawing or
withholding life-sustaining treatments are far from reaching a
compromise.
Figure 1. The role of the Free Choice principle in perceiving patients’ death status. A regression analysis was run to evaluate how the two
moral principles (FC and SL) modulated the evaluation of the death status of patients. The overall equation was significant R
2=.41, F(11, 190)=12.05,
p,.0001 and the figure shows the significant interaction between Pathology and FC, where the linear regression curves and their corresponding
equations for PVS, MCS, LI, and TI are given.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031735.g001
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First, although both female and male participants were equally
distributed in the four pathology conditions, our sample was not
balanced for gender and the obtained results might predominantly
reflect females’ judgments. However, when tested, no significant
differences between men and women were found for either death
status perception or appropriateness of treatment withdrawal. A
further caveat of our study consists of the young age of our sample:
attitudes toward life prolongation and disease may change
substantially in old age. However, the results obtained by a
questionnaire sent to the members of the European Society of
Intensive Care Medicine showed that older physicians were more
likely than younger physicians to feel that therapy should be
withdrawn from patients with no chance of regaining a meaningful
life [27]. Furthermore, Blackhall et al. [28] investigated the
attitudes of people aged 65 and older toward life sustaining
technology demonstrating no significant difference in general
attitude for age. Whether the attitudes expressed in our results are
translated into real behavior (withdrawal of life support) remains
open.
To conclude, the moral principles in which people believe affect
not only their judgments concerning the agreement to withdraw
life-sustaining treatment in patients with severe brain injury who
ask for it, but also the perception of their death status. Indeed, our
findings show that in the dispute regarding end-of-life issues there
are more than just different values and opinions: How can we deal
with different perceptions of the life status of patients?
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